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Abstract—There has been a tremendous rise in the growth of
online social networks all over the world in recent years. It has
facilitated users to generate a large amount of real-time content
at an incessant rate, all competing with each other to attract
enough attention and become popular trends. While Western
online social networks such as Twitter have been well studied,
the popular Chinese microblogging network Sina Weibo has had
relatively lower exposure. In this paper, we analyze in detail
the temporal aspect of trends and trend-setters in Sina Weibo,
contrasting it with earlier observations in Twitter. We find that
there is a vast difference in the content shared in China when
compared to a global social network such as Twitter. In China,
the trends are created almost entirely due to the retweets of
media content such as jokes, images and videos, unlike Twitter
where it has been shown that the trends tend to have more
to do with current global events and news stories. We take a
detailed look at the formation, persistence and decay of trends
and examine the key topics that trend in Sina Weibo. One of
our key findings is that retweets are much more common in
Sina Weibo and contribute a lot to creating trends. When we
look closer, we observe that most trends in Sina Weibo are due
to the continuous retweets of a small percentage of fraudulent
accounts. These fake accounts are set up to artificially inflate
certain posts, causing them to shoot up into Sina Weibo’s
trending list, which are in turn displayed as the most popular
topics to users.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, social media services
as well as the users who subscribe to them,
have grown at a phenomenal rate. This im-
mense growth has been witnessed all over the
world with millions of people of different back-
grounds using these services on a daily basis.
This widespread generation and consumption
of content has created an extremely complex
and competitive online environment where dif-
ferent types of content compete with each other
for the attention of users. It is very interesting
to study how certain types of content such as
a viral video, a news article, or an illustrative
picture, manage to attract more attention than
others, thus bubbling to the top in terms of
popularity. Through their visibility, these popu-
lar topics contribute to the collective awareness
reflecting what is considered important. It can
also be powerful enough to affect the public
agenda of the community.
There have been prior studies on the charac-
teristics of trends and trend-setters in Western
online social media ( [1], [2]). In this paper, we
examine in detail a significantly less-studied
but equally fascinating online environment:
Chinese social media, in particular, Sina Weibo:
China’s biggest microblogging network.
Over the years there have been news reports
on various Internet phenomena in China, from
the surfacing of certain viral videos to the
spreading of rumors ( [3]) to the so called “hu-
man flesh search engines”: a primarily Chinese
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2Internet phenomenon of massive search using
online media such as blogs and forums ( [4]).
These stories seem to suggest that many events
happening in Chinese online social networks
are unique products of China’s culture and
social environment.
Due to the vast global connectivity provided
by social media, netizens all over the world
are now connected to each other like never
before; they can now share and exchange ideas
with ease. It could be argued that the manner
in which the sharing occurs should be similar
across countries. However, China’s unique cul-
tural and social environment suggests that the
way individuals share ideas might be different
than that in Western societies [5]. For example,
the age of Internet users in China is a lot
younger. So it is likely that they may respond
to different types of content than Internet users
in Western societies. The number of Internet
users in China is larger than that in the U.S, and
the majority of users live in large urban cities.
One would expect that the way these users
share information can be even more chaotic.
An important question to ask is to what extent
would topics have to compete with each other
in order to capture users’ attention in this
dynamic environment. Furthermore, as docu-
mented by [6], it is known that the information
shared between individuals in Chinese social
media is monitored. Hence another interesting
question to ask is what types of content would
netizens respond to and what kind of popular
topics would emerge u nder such constant
surveillance.
Given the above questions, we present an
analysis on the evolution of trends in Sina
Weibo. We monitored the evolution of the top
trending keywords in Sina Weibo for 30 days.
First, we analyzed the model of growth in these
trends and examined the persistance of these
topics over time. In this regard, we investigated
if topics initially ranked higher tend to stay
in the list of top 50 trending topics longer.
Subsequently, by analyzing the timestamps of
tweets, we looked at the propagation and de-
caying process of the trends in Sina Weibo and
compare it to earlier observations of Twitter [1].
Our findings are as follows:
• We discovered that the majority of trends
in Sina Weibo are arising from frivolous
content, such as jokes and funny images
and photos unlike Twitter where the trends
are mainly news-driven.
• We established that retweets play a greater
role in Sina Weibo than in Twitter, con-
tributing more to the generation and per-
sistence of trends.
• Upon examining the tweets in detail, we
made an important discovery. We ob-
served that many trending keywords in
Sina Weibo are heavily manipulated and
controlled by certain fraudulent accounts.
The irregular activities by these accounts
made certain tweets more visible to users
in general.
• We found significant evidence suggesting
that a large percentage of the trends in
Sina Weibo are due to artificial inflation by
fraudulent accounts. The users we identi-
fied as fraudulent were 1.08% of the total
users sampled, but they were responsible
for 49% of the total retweets (32% of the
total tweets).
• We evaluated some methods to identify
fraudulent accounts. After we removed
the tweets associated with fraudulent ac-
counts, the evolution of the tweets con-
taining trending keywords follow the same
persistent and decaying process as the one
in Twitter.
The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section 2 we provide background in-
formation on the development of Internet in
China and on the Sina Weibo social network.
In Section 3 we survey some related work on
trends and spam in social media. In Section
4, we perform a detailed analysis of trending
topics in Sina Weibo. In Section 5, we provide
a discussion of our findings.
2 BACKGROUND
In this Section, we provide some background
information on the Internet in China, the devel-
opment of Chinese social media services, and
Sina Weibo, the most popular microblog service
in China
32.1 The Internet in China
The development of the Internet industry in
China over the past decade has been impres-
sive. According to a survey from the China In-
ternet Network Information Center (CNNIC),
by July 2008, the number of Internet users in
China has reached 253 million, surpassing the
U.S. as the world’s largest Internet market [7].
Furthermore, the number of Internet users in
China as of 2010 was reported to be 420 million.
Despite this, the fractional Internet penetra-
tion rate in China is still low. The 2010 survey
by CNNIC on the Internet development in
China [8] reports that the Internet penetration
rate in the rural areas of China is on average
5.1%. In contrast, the Internet penetration rate
in the urban cities of China is on average
21.6%. In metropolitan cities such as Beijing
and Shanghai, the Internet penetration rate has
reached over 45%, with Beijing being 46.4% and
Shanghai being 45.8% [8].
According to the survey by CNNIC in 2010
[7], China’s cyberspace is dominated by urban
students between the age of 18–30 (see Figure
1 and Figure 2, taken from [7]).
Fig. 1. Age Distribution of Internet Users in
China
The Government plays an important role in
fostering the advance of the Internet industry
in China. Tai [6] points out four major stages
of Internet development in China, “with each
period reflecting a substantial change not only
in technological progress and application, but
also in the Government’s approach to and ap-
parent perception of the Internet.”
Fig. 2. The Occupation Distribution of Internet
Users in China
According to The Internet in China 1 released
by the Information Office of the State Council
of China:
The Chinese government attaches
great importance to protecting the safe
flow of Internet information, actively
guides people to manage websites in
accordance with the law and use the
Internet in a wholesome and correct
way.
2.2 Chinese Online Social Networks
Online social networks are a major part of
the Chinese Internet culture [3]. Netizens2 in
China organize themselves using forums, dis-
cussion groups, blogs, and social networking
platforms to engage in activities such as ex-
changing viewpoints and sharing information
[3]. According to The Internet in China:
Vigorous online ideas exchange is a
major characteristic of China’s Inter-
net development, and the huge quan-
tity of BBS posts and blog articles is
1. “The Internet in China” by the Information Office of the
State Council of the People’s Republic of China is available at
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/201006/t667385.htm
2. A netizen is a person actively involved in online commu-
nities [9].
4far beyond that of any other country.
China’s websites attach great impor-
tance to providing netizens with opin-
ion expression services, with over 80%
of them providing electronic bulletin
service. In China, there are over a
million BBSs and some 220 million
bloggers. According to a sample sur-
vey, each day people post over three
million messages via BBS, news com-
mentary sites, blogs, etc., and over
66% of Chinese netizens frequently
place postings to discuss various top-
ics, and to fully express their opinions
and represent their interests. The new
applications and services on the In-
ternet have provided a broader scope
for people to express their opinions.
The newly emerging online services,
including blog, microblog, video shar-
ing and social networking websites
are developing rapidly in China and
provide greater convenience for Chi
nese citizens to communicate online.
Actively participating in online in-
formation communication and con-
tent creation, netizens have greatly en-
riched Internet information and con-
tent.
2.3 Sina Weibo
Sina Weibo was launched by the Sina corpo-
ration, China’s biggest web portal, in August
2009. It has been reported by the Sina corpo-
ration that Sina Weibo now has 250 million
registered accounts and generates 90 million
posts per day. Similar to Twitter, a user profile
in Sina Weibo displays the user’s name, a brief
description of the user, the number of followers
and followees the user has. There are three
types of user accounts in Sina Weibo, regular
user accounts, verified user accounts, and the
expert (star) user account. A verified user ac-
count typically represents a well known public
figure or organization in China.
Twitter users can address tweets to other
users and can mention others in their tweets.
A common practice in Twitter is “retweeting”,
or rebroadcasting someone else’s messages to
one’s followers. The equivalent of a retweet in
Sina Weibo is instead shown as two amalga-
mated entries: the original entry and the cur-
rent user’s actual entry which is a commentary
on the original entry.
Sina Weibo has another functionality absent
from Twitter: the comment. When a Sina Weibo
user makes a comment, it is not rebroadcasted
to the user’s followers. Instead, it can only be
accessed under the original message.
3 RELATED WORK
In this Section, we provide a survey of papers
in two related areas: spam detection and the
study of trends in social networks. In each
area, we present work on both Western social
networks and Chinese social networks.
3.1 Spam Detection in Twitter
Spam and bot detection in social networks is
a relatively recent area of research, motivated
by the vast popularity of social websites such
as Twitter and Facebook. It draws on research
from several areas of computer science such
as computer security, machine learning, and
network analysis.
In the 2010 work by Benevenuto et al [10], the
authors examine spam detection in Twitter by
first collecting a large dataset of more than 54
million users, 1.9 billion links, and 1.8 billion
tweets. After exploring content and behavoir
attributes, they developed an SVM classifier
and was able to detect spammers with 70% pre-
cision and non-spammers with 96% precision.
As an insightful follow up, the authors used
χ2 statistics to evaluate the importance of the
attributes they used in their model.
The second paper with direct application to
spam detection in Twitter was by Wang [11].
Wang motivated his research with the statistic
that an estimated 3% of messages in Twitter
are spam. The dataset used in in this study
was relatively smaller, gathering information
from 25,847 users, 500 thousand tweets, and
49 million follower/friend relationships. Wang
used decision trees, neural network, SVM, and
naive Bayesian models.
5Finally, Lee et al. [12] described a differ-
ent approach to detect spammers. They cre-
ated honeypot user accounts in Twitter and
recorded the features of users who interact with
these accounts. They then used these features
to develop a classifier with high precision.
3.2 Spam Detection in General Online So-
cial Networks
In social bookmarking websites, Markines et al.
[13] used just 6 features - tag spam, tag blur,
document structure, number of ads, plagiarism,
and valid links, to develop a classifier with 98%
accuracy.
On facebook, Boshmaf et al. successfully
launched a network of social bots [14]. Despite
Facebook’s bot detection system, the authors
were able to achieve an 80% infiltration rate
over 8 weeks.
In online ad exchanges, advertisers pay web-
sites for each user that clicks through an ad
to their website. The way fraud occurs in this
domain is for bots to click through ads on
a website owned by the botnet owners. The
money at stake in this case has made the bots
employed very sophisticated. The botnet own-
ers use increasingly stealthy, distributed traffic
to avoid detection. Stone et al. examined vari-
ous attacks and prevention techniques in cost
per click ad exchanges [15]. Yu et al. [16] gave
a sophisticated approach to detect low-rate bot
traffic by developing a model that examines
query logs to detect coordination across bots
within a botnet.
3.3 Spam Detection in Chinese Online So-
cial Networks
Some studies had been done on spam and
bot detection in Chinese online social networks
[17], [18]. Xu et al. [19] observed the spammers
in Sina Weibo and found that the spammers can
be classified into two categories: promoters and
robot accounts.
Lin et al. [20] presented an analysis of spam-
ming behaviors in Sina Weibo. Using methods
such as proactive honeypots, keyword based
search and buying spammer samples directly
from online merchants. they were able to col-
lect a large set of spammer samples. Through
their analysis they found three representative
spamming behaviors: aggressive advertising,
repeated duplicate reposting, and aggressive
following.
spammer identification system. Through
tests with real data it is demonstrated that the
system can effectively detect the spamming be-
haviors and identify spammers in Sina Weibo.
3.4 Battling the “Internet Water Army” in
Chinese Online Social Networks
One relevant area of research is the study of
the “Online Water Army” 3. It represents full-
time or part-time paid posters hired by PR
companies to help in raising the popularity of a
specific company or person by posting articles,
replies, and comments in online social net-
works. According to CCTV 4, these paid posters
in China help their customers using one of the
following three tactics: 1. promoting a specific
product, company or person; 2. smear/slander
competitors; 3. help deleting negative posts or
comments.
st in BBS systems, and online social net-
works.
In the work by Chen et al. [21], the authors
examined comments in the Chinese news web-
sites such as Sina.com and Sohu.com and used
reply, activity, and semantic features to de-
velop an SVM classifier via the LIBSVM Python
library with 95% accuracy at detecting paid
posters. Interesting information discussed in
the paper includes the organizational structure
of PR firms which hire the paid posters and
the choice of features: percentage of replies,
average interval time of posts, active days, and
number of reports commented on.
3.5 Measuring Influences in Online Social
Networks
For many years the structural properties of var-
ious Western social networks have been well
studied by sociologists and computer scientists
[22] [23] [24] [25].
In social network analysis, social influence
refers to the concept of people modifying their
3. e.g., http://shuijunwang.com or http://www.51shuijun.net
4. see report in Chinese at
http://news.cntv.cn/china/20101107/102619.shtml
6behavior to bring them closer to the behavior of
their friends. In a social-affiliation network con-
sists of nodes representing individuals, links
representing friendships, and nodes represent-
ing foci: “social, psychological, legal, or phys-
ical entities around which joint activities are
organized (e.g., workplace, social groups) [26]”,
if A and B are friends, and F is a focus that A
participates in. Over time, B can participate in
the same focus due to A’s involvement, this is
called a membership closure [26].
Agarwal et al. [27] examined methods to
identify influential bloggers in the blogosphere.
They discovered that the most influential blog-
gers are not necessarily the most active. Back-
strom et al. [28] studied the characteristics of
membership closure in LiveJournal. Crandall et
al. [29] studied the adaptation of influences
between editors of Wikipedia articles.
Romero et al. [30] measured retweets in
Twitter and found that passivity was a major
factor when it comes to message forwarding.
Based on this result, they presented a measure
of social influences that takes into account the
passivity of the audience in social networks.
3.6 The Study of Trends in Twitter
There are various studies on trends in Twitter
[2] [31] [32] [33].
One of the most extensive investigations into
trending topics in Twitter was by Asur et al.
[34]. The authors examined the growth and
persistence of trending topics in Twitter and
observed that it follows a log-normal distri-
bution of popularity. Accordingly, most topics
faded from popularity relatively quickly, while
a few topics lasted for long periods of time.
They estimated the average duration of topics
to be around 20-40 minutes. When they exam-
ined the content of the trends, they observed
that traditional notions of influence such as the
frequency of posting and the number of follow-
ers were not the main drivers of popularity in
trends. Rather it was the resonating nature of
the content that was important. An interesting
finding was that news topics from traditional
media sources such as CNN, New York Times
and ESPN was shown to be some of the most
popular and long lasting trending topics in
Twitter, suggesting that Twitter amplifies some
of the broader trends occurring in society.
Cha et al. [35] explored user influences on
Twitter trends and discovered some interesting
results. First, users with many followers were
found to not be very effective in generating
mentions or retweets. Second, the most influ-
ential users tend to influence more than one
topic. Third, influences were found to not arise
spontaneously, but instead as the result of fo-
cused efforts, often concentrating on one topic.
3.7 Social Influences and the Propagation
of Information in Chinese Social Networks
Researchers have analyzed the structure of var-
ious Chinese offline social networks [36] [37]
[38] [39] [40].
There have been only a few studies on social
influences in Chinese online social networks.
Jin [3] studied the structure and interface of
Chinese online Bulletin Board Systems (BBS)
and the behavioral patterns of its users. Xin
[41] conducted a survey of BBS’s influence on
University students in China. Yu et al. [42]
looked at the adaptation of books, movies, mu-
sic, events and discussion groups on Douban,
the largest online media database and one of
the largest online communities in China.
In a similar area, there are some studies on
the structural properties and the characteristics
of information propagation in Chinese online
social networks [43] [44], [45], [46], [47]. Yang et
al. [48] noted that various information services
(e.g., eBay, Orkut, and Yahoo!) encountered
serious challenges when entering China. They
presented an empirical study of social interac-
tions among Chinese netizens based on over
4 years of comprehensive data collected from
Mitbbs (www.mitbbs.com), the most frequently
used online forum for Chinese nationals who
are studying or working abroad.
Lin et al. [49] presented a comparison of the
interaction patterns between two of the largest
online social networks in China: Renren and
Sina Weibo. Niu et al. [50] gave an empirical
analysis of Renren, it follows an exponentially
truncated power law in-degree distribution,
and has a short average node distance.
King et al. [5] studied the concept of guanxi,
a unique dyadic social construct, as applied
7to the interaction between web sites in China.
Chang et al. [51] studied a special case of the
propagation of information in Chinese online
social networks: the sending and receiving of
messages containing wishes and moral sup-
port. They provided analysis on the data from
Linkwish, a micro social network for wish
sharing with users mainly from Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Macao.
Fan et al. [52] looked at the propagation of
emotion in Sina Weibo. They found that the
correlation of anger among users is signifi-
cantly higher than that of joy, which indicates
that angry emotion could spread more quickly
and broadly in the network. And, there is a
stronger sentiment correlation between a pair
of users if they share more interactions. Finally,
users with larger number of friends possess
more significant sentiment influence to their
neighborhoods.
4 ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND TREND-
SETTERS IN SINA WEIBO
4.1 The Trending Keywords
Sina Weibo offers a list of 50 keywords that
appear most frequently in users’ tweets. They
are ranked according to the frequency of ap-
pearances in the last hour. This is similar to
Twitter, which also presents a constantly up-
dated list of trending topics: keywords that are
most frequently used in tweets over a period
of time. We extracted these keywords over a
period of 30 days (from June 18th, 2011 to July
18th, 2011) and retrieved all the corresponding
tweets containing these keywords from Sina
Weibo.
We first monitored the hourly evolution of
the top 50 keywords in the trending list for 30
days. We observed that the average time spent
by each keyword in the hourly trending list is
6 hours. And the distribution for the number
of hours each topic remains on the top 50
trending list follows the power law (as shown
in Figure 3 a). The distribution suggests that
only a few topics exhibit long-term popularity.
Another interesting observation is that a lot
of the key words tend to disappear from the
top 50 trending list after a certain amount of
time and then later reappear. We examined the
distribution for the number of times keywords
reappear in the top 50 trending list (Figure 3
b). We observe that this distribution follows the
power law as well.
Both the above observations are very similar
to the earlier study of trending topics in Twitter
by [1]. However, one important difference with
Twitter is that the average trending time is
significantly higher in Sina Weibo (in Twitter it
was 20-40 minutes). This suggests that Weibo
may not have as many topics competing for
attention as Twitter.
Following our observation that some key-
words stay in the top 50 trending list longer
than others, we wanted to investigate if topics
that are ranked higher initially tend to stay in
the top 50 trending list longer. We separated
the top 50 trending keywords into two ranked
sets of 25 each: the top 25 and the bottom 25.
Figure 4 illustrates the plot for the percentage
of topics that placed in the bottom 25 relating to
the number of hours these topics stayed in the
top 50 trending list. We can observe that topics
that do not last are usually the ones that are
in the bottom 25. On the other hand, the long-
trending topics spend most of their time in the
top 25, which suggests that items that become
very popular are more likely to stay longer in
the top 50. This intuitively means that items
that attract phenomenal attention initially are
not likely to dissipate quickly from people’s
interests.
Fig. 4. Distribution of trending times for topics in
the bottom 25 of the top 50 trend list
8Fig. 3. Distributions of trending time and the number of times topics reappeared
4.2 The Evolution of Tweets
Next, we investigate the process of persis-
tence and decay for the trending topics in
Sina Weibo. In particular, we want to measure
the distribution for the time intervals between
tweets containing the trending keywords. We
continuously monitored the keywords in the
top 50 trending list and for each trending topic
we retrieved all the tweets containing the key-
word from the time the topic first appeared in
the top 50 trending list until the time it dis-
appeared. Accordingly, we collected complete
data for 811 topics over the course of 30 days
(from June 20th, 2011 to July 20nd, 2011). In
total we collected 574,382 tweets from 463,231
users. Among the 574,382 Tweets, 35% of the
tweets (202,267 tweets) are original tweets,
and 65% of the tweets (372,115 tweets) are
retweets. 40.3% of the total users (187130 users)
retweeted at least once in our sample.
We measured the number of tweets that each
topic gets in 10 minute intervals, from the time
the topic starts trending until the time it stops.
From this we can sum up the tweet counts over
time to obtain the cumulative number of tweets
Nq(ti) of topic q for any time frame ti, This is
given as :
Nq(ti) =
i∑
τ=1
nq(tτ) (1)
where nq(t) is the number of tweets on topic
q in time interval t. We then calculate the ratios
Cq(ti, tj) = Nq(ti)/Nq(tj) for topic q for time
frames ti and tj .
Figure 5 shows the distribution of Cq(ti, tj)’s
over all topics for two arbitrarily chosen pairs
of time frames: (10, 2) and (8, 3) (nevertheless
such that ti > tj , and ti is relatively large, and
tj is small).
These figures suggest that the ratios Cq(ti, tj)
are distributed according to the log-normal
distributions. We tested and confirmed that
the distributions indeed follow the log-normal
distributions.
This finding agrees with the result from a
similar experiment in Twitter trends. Asur and
others [1] argued that the log-normal distribu-
tion occurs due to the multiplicative process
involved in the growth of trends which incor-
porates the decay of novelty as well as the
rate of propagation. The intuitive explanation is
that at each time step the number of new tweets
(original tweets or retweets) on a topic is mul-
tiplied over the tweets that we already have.
The number of past tweets, in turn, is a proxy
for the number of users that are aware of the
topic up to that point. These users discuss the
topic on different forums, including Twitter, es-
sentially creating an effective network through
which the topic spreads. As more users talk
9Fig. 5. The distribution of Cq(ti, tj)’s over all topics for two arbitrarily chosen pairs of time frames:
(10, 2) and (8, 3)
about a particular topic, many others are likely
to learn about it, thus giving the multiplicative
nature of the spreading. On the other hand,
the monotically decreasing decaying process
characterizes the decay in timeliness and nove
lty of the topic as it slowly becomes obsolete.
However, while only 35% of the tweets in
Twitter are retweets, there is a much larger
percentage of tweets that are retweets in Sina
Weibo. From our sample we observed that
a high 65% of the tweets are retweets. This
implies that the topics are trending mainly be-
cause of some content that has been retweeted
many times. Thus, Sina Weibo users are more
likely to learn about a particular topic through
retweets.
4.3 Trend-setters in Sina Weibo
For every new trending keyword we retrieved
the most retweeted tweets in the past hour and
compiled a list of most retweeted users. Table
1 illustrates the top 20 most retweeted authors
appearing in at least 10 trending topics each.
The influential authors are ranked according
to the ratio between the number of times the
authors’ tweets are retweeted and the number
of trending topics these tweets appeared in.
From Table 1 we observed that only 4 out
of the top 20 influential authors were verified
accounts. The 4 verified accounts represent an
urban fashion magazine, a fashion brand, an
online travel magazine, and a Chinese celebrity.
The other 16 influential authors are unverified
accounts. They all seem to have a strong fo-
cus on collecting user-contributed jokes, movie
trivia, quizzes, stories and so on. This is in
sharp contrast to the topics that are popular in
Twitter as reported by [1]. When we looked at
a longer list of authors we observed the same
trend. The most popular items were all related
to frivolous content and media, unlike Twitter
which had a strong affinity towards news and
current events.
The “# of Times Tweeted” column in Ta-
ble 1 gives the unique tweets that have been
retweeted. We can observe that the rate at
which they have been retweeted is phenom-
enal. For example, the top retweeted user
posted 37 tweets which in total were retweeted
1194999 times.
4.4 The Evolution of Retweets and Original
Tweets
In the next experiemnt, we separate the tweets
in Sina Weibo into original tweets and retweets
and calculate the densities of ratios between cu-
mulative retweets/original tweets counts mea-
sured in different time frames. Figure 6 shows
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TABLE 1
Top 20 Retweeted Users in At Least 10 Trending Topics
Account Descriptions Verified # of Times Retweeted # of Tweets # of Topics
1 Fashion Magazine Yes 1194999 37 12
2 Fashion Brand Yes 849404 21 13
3 Travel Magazine Yes 127737 123 21
4 Gourmet Factory No 553586 86 12
5 Horoscopes No 1545955 101 38
6 Silly Jokes No 3210130 258 81
7 Good Movies No 1497968 140 38
8 Wonderful Quotes No 602528 39 17
9 Global Music No 697308 116 22
10 Funny Jokes No 3667566 438 121
11 Creative Ideas No 742178 111 25
12 Chinese singer Yes 284600 25 10
13 Good Music No 323022 52 12
14 Movie Factory No 1509003 230 59
15 Strange Stories No 1668910 250 66
16 Beautiful Pictures No 435312 33 18
17 Global Music No 432444 65 18
18 Female Fashion No 809440 87 34
19 Useful Tips No 735070 153 31
20 Funny Quizzes No 589477 77 25
the distributions of original tweets/retweets
ratios over all topics for two arbitrarily chosen
pairs of time frames: (10, 2) and (8, 3).
We find (as the last two sub-figures in Figure
6 show) that the distributions of ratios for orig-
inal tweets follow the log-normal distribution.
However, we observe (as the first two sub-
figures in Figure 6 show) that for retweets, the
distributions do not satisfy all the properties
of the log-normal distribution. This is indicated
by the large amount of low retweet ratios in the
distribution. Furthermore, there are high spikes
in the lower ratios area of the distribution.
4.5 Identifying Spam Activity in Sina
Weibo
From Figure 6 in the previous Section we ob-
served that there is a high percentage of low
ratios in the distribution of retweet ratios. This
suggests that for a lot of the topics, there is an
initial flurry of retweets. We hypothesize that
this is due to the activities of certain users in
Sina Weibo. As these accounts post a tweet,
they tend to set up many other fake accounts
to continuously retweet this tweet, expecting
that the high retweet numbers would propel
the tweet to place in the Sina Weibo hourly
trending list. This would then cause other users
to notice the tweet more after it has emerged
as the top hourly, daily, or weekly trend setter.
We attempt to verify the above hypothesis
empirically. We define a spamming account as
one that is set up for the purpose of repeat-
edly retweeting certain messages, thus giving
these messages artificially inflated popularity.
According to our hypothesis, the users who
retweet abnormally high amounts are more
likely to be spam accounts.
Figure 7 a) illustrates the distribution for
the number of users and their corresponding
number of retweets (over all topics). Figure 7
b) illustrates the distribution for the number
of users and the numbers of topics that they
caused to trend by their retweets. We observe
that both distributions in Figure 7 follow the
power law. This implies that there are certain
users who retweet a lot, and a small number
of users are responsible for a large number of
topics. Next, we investigate who these users
are. We manually checked the top 40 accounts
who retweeted the most. To our surprise, 37 of
these 40 accounts could no longer be accessed.
That is, when we queried the accounts’ IDs, we
retrieved a message from Sina Weibo stating
that the account has been removed and can no
longer be accessed (see Figure 8).
According to Sina Weibo’s frequently asked
question page, if a user sends a tweet contain-
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Fig. 6. The densities of ratios between cumulative original tweets/retweets counts measured in two
arbitrary time frames: (10, 2) and (8, 3)
ing illegal or sensitive information, such tweet
will be immediately deleted by Sina Weibo’s
administrators, however, the users’ accounts
will still be active. For the above reason we
assume that if an account was active one month
ago and can no longer be reached, it indicates
that this account has very likely performed
malicious activities such as spamming and has
hence been deleted.
Next, we inspect the user accounts with the
most retweets in our sample and the number of
accounts they retweeted. We see that although
these accounts retweeted a lot, they mostly
only retweet messages from a few users. We re-
organize the users who retweeted by the ratio
between the number of times he/she retweeted
and the number of users he/she retweeted. We
refer to this as the user-retweet ratio. Table
2 illustrates the top 10 users with the highest
user-retweet ratios. We note that for all these
users, they each retweet posts from only one
account. We observe that this is true for the
top 30 accounts with the highest user-retweet
ratios.
Next, we conduct the following experiment:
starting from the users with the highest user-
retweet ratios, we used a crawler to automati-
cally visit and retrieve each user’s Sina Weibo
account. Thus we measured the percentage of
user accounts that can still be accessed (as
opposed to be directed to the error page) or-
ganized by user-retweet ratios (Table 3). We
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Fig. 7. The distribution for the number of users’ retweets and the number of topics users’ retweets
trend in
TABLE 2
The top 10 accounts with the highest user-retweet ratios (u-r ratio)
User ID Number of Retweets Number of Users Retweeted U-R Ratio
1840241580 134 1 134
2241506824 125 1 125
1840263604 68 1 68
1840237192 64 1 64
1840251632 64 1 64
2208320854 55 1 55
2208320990 51 1 51
2208329370 48 1 48
2218142513 47 1 47
1843422117 44 1 44
observe that only 12% of the accounts with
user-retweet ratios of above 30 are active. And,
as user-retweet ratios decrease, the percentages
of active accounts slowly increase. We consider
this to be strong evidence for the hypothesis
that user accounts with high user-retweet ratios
are likely to be spam accounts.
We observe that in some cases, accounts with
lower user-retweet ratios can still be a spam
account. For example, an account could retweet
a number of posts from other spam accounts,
thus minimizing the suspicion of being de-
tected as a spam account itself.
4.6 Removing Spammers in Sina Weibo
From our sample, after automatically checking
each account, we identified 4985 accounts that
were deleted by the Sina Weibo administra-
tor. We called these 4985 accounts “suspected
spam accounts”. There were 463,231 users in
our sample, and 187,130 of them retweeted at
least once. Thus we identified 1.08% of the
total users (2.66% of users that retweeted) as
suspected spam accounts.
Next, in order to measure the effect of spam
on the Weibo network, we removed all retweets
from our sample disseminated by suspected
spam accounts as well as posts published by
them (and then later retweeted by others). We
hypothesize that by removing these retweets,
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TABLE 3
The percentage of accounts whose profiles can still be accessed, organized by user-retweet ratio
Ratio Percentage of Active Accounts Percentage of Inactive Accounts
≥30 12% 88%
20 – 29 38% 63%
11 – 19 16% 84%
10 22% 78%
9 12% 88%
8 16% 84%
7 15% 85%
6 21% 79%
5 30% 70%
4 58% 42%
3 80% 20%
2 96% 4%
1 92% 8%
Fig. 8. An Example of an Error Page
we can eliminate the influences caused by
the suspected spam accounts. We observed
that after these posts were removed, we were
left with only 189,686 retweets in our sample
(51% of the original total retweets). In other
words, by removing retweets associated wth
suspected spam accounts, we successfully re-
moved 182,429 retweets, which is 49% of
the total retweets and 32% of total tweets
(both retweets and original tweets) from our
sample. This result is very interesting because
it shows that a large amount of retweets in our
sample are associated with suspected spam ac-
counts. The spam accounts are therefore artifi-
cially inflating the popularity of topics, causing
them to trend.
To see the difference after the posts associ-
ated with suspected spam accounts were re-
moved, we re-calculated the distribution of
user-retweet ratios again for arbitrarily chosen
pairs of time frames. Figure 9 illustrates the dis-
tribution for time frames (10, 2). We observed
that the distribution is now much smoother
and seem to follow the log-normal distribution.
We performed the log-normal test and verified
that this is indeed the case.
Fig. 9. The distribution of retweet ratios for time
frame (10, 2) after the removal of tweets associ-
ated with suspected spam accounts
4.7 Spammers and Trend-setters
We found 6824 users in our sample whose
tweets were retweeted. However, the total
number of users who retweeted at least one
person’s tweet was 187130, which is very
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skewed. Figure 10 illustrates the distribution
for the number of times users were retweeted.
This distribution follows the power law.
Fig. 10. The distribution for the frequency of
retweets of user posts
We discovered that the number of users
whose tweets were retweeted by the suspected
spam accounts was 4665, which is a surprising
68% of the users who were retweeted in our
sample. This shows that the suspected spam
accounts affect a majority of the trend-setters
in our sample, helping them raise the retweet
number of their posts and thereby making their
posts appear on the trending list. The overall
effect of the spammers is very significant. We
also observed that a high 98% of the total trend-
ing keywords can be found in posts retweeted
by suspected spam accounts. Thus it can also
be argued that many of the trends themselves
are artificially generated, which is a very im-
portant result.
4.8 Examples of Spam Accounts
Next, we investigate the activities of typical
spam accounts in Sina Weibo. We have shown
that accounts with high retweet ratios are likely
to be spam accounts. Although the majority
of the accounts had already been deleted by
the administrator, we manually inspected 100
currently existing accounts with high retweet
ratios and found that 95 clearly participate in
spamming activities. The other 5 were regu-
lar users supporting their favorite singers and
celebrities by repeatedly retweeting their posts,
which can also be construed as spam; however,
we exclude those from our list of suspected
spam accounts. Figure 11 illustrates two ex-
amples of the activities from suspected spam
accounts.
Fig. 11. Example of a spam account
First, we observe that the suspected spam ac-
counts we inspected tend to repeatedly retweet
the same post with the goal of increasing the
retweet number of said post. Next, the interval
time of these repeated retweets tend to be very
close to each other with long breaks between
each set. Finally, we observe that the replies
left from spam accounts often do not make any
sense (see the comments circled in Figure 11).
[21] had similar findings, and explained that
this was because the paid posters are mainly
interested in finishing the job as quickly as
possible, thus they tend to retweet multiple
times in short bursts and leave gibberish as
replies. We observe that the replies in 11 a) and
b) are not proper sentences.
For the 4665 users whose tweets were
retweeted by at least one suspected spam ac-
count, we calculate the percentage of retweets
from spam accounts and the percentage of
suspected spam accounts involved. We selected
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only accounts whose tweets were retweeted by
at least 50% of the accounts that are suspected
spam accounts. From our manual inspection
we found mainly three types of accounts:
1) Verified accounts from celebrities and re-
ality show contestants: We hypothesize
that they employ spam accounts to boast
the popularity of their posts, making it
seem like the posts were retweeted by
many fans;
2) Verified accounts from companies: We
hypothesize that they employ spam ac-
counts to boast the perceived popularity
of their products;
3) Unverified accounts with posts consist of
ads for products: We hypothesize that
these accounts employ spam accounts to
distribute the ads and to boast the per-
ceived popularity of their products, hop-
ing other users will notice and distribute
(see Figure 12 for an example).
Fig. 12. Example of an account using spam
5 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have examined the tweets relating to the
trending topics in Sina Weibo. First we ana-
lyzed the growth and persistence of trends.
When we looked at the distribution of tweets
over time, we observed that there was a sig-
nificant difference when contrasted with Twit-
ter. The effect of retweets in Sina Weibo was
significantly higher than in Twitter. We also
found that many of the accounts that contribute
to trends tend to operate as user contributed
online magazines, sharing amusing pictures,
jokes, stories and antidotes. Such posts tend
to recieve a large amount of responses from
users and thus retweets. Yang et al. [48] have
shown similar results about Mitbbs users for-
warding amusing messages and “virtual gifts”
to online friends. The effect of this is similar
to that of sending “a cyber greeting card”.
This phenomenon can also be observed from
text messages sent from cell phones between
individuals in China [53]. This is interesting in
the context of there being strong censorship in
chinese social media. It can be hypothesized
that under such circumstances, it is these kind
of “safe” topics that can emerge.
When we examined the retweets in more
detail, we made an important discovery. We
found that 49% of the retweets in Sina Weibo
containing trending keywords were actually
associated with fraudulent accounts. We ob-
served that these accounts comprised of a small
amount (1.08% of the total users) of users but
were responsible for a large percentage of the
total retweets for the trending keywords. These
fake accounts are responsible for artificially
inflating certain posts, thus creating fake trends
in Sina Weibo.
We relate our finding to the questions we
raised in the introduction. There is a strong
competition among content in online social me-
dia to become popular and trend and this gives
motivation to users to artificially inflate topics
to gain a competitive edge. We hypothesize
that certain accounts in Sina Weibo employ
fake accounts to repeatedly repeat their tweets
in order to propel them to the top trending list,
thus gaining prominence as top trend setters
(and more visible to other users). We found
evidence suggesting that the accounts that do
so tend to be verified accounts with commercial
purposes.
It is clear that the owners of these user con-
tributed online magazines see this as a business
opportunity to gain audience for their content.
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They can start by generating and propagating
popular content and subsequently begin insert-
ing advertisements amongst the jokes in their
their Sina Weibo accounts. The artificial infla-
tion makes it an even more effective campaign.
We have found that we can effectively detect
suspected spam accounts using retweet ratios.
This can lead to future work such as using
machine learning to identify other spamming
techniques. In the future, we would like to ex-
amine the behavior of these fake accounts that
contribute to artificial inflation in Sina Weibo
to learn how successful they are in influencing
trends.
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